A concept is not an isolated, ossified changeless formation, but an active part of the intellectual process, constantly engaged in serving communication, understanding, and problem solving.
Introduction
Vygotsky's statement captures the idea that mundane concepts are dynamic and sociocultural in nature. As such, they are neither completely fixed units of representation nor solely mental representations, but arise, develop and live in the interactions among the people that create and use them. This idea is quite compatible with the notion of concepts as participants in the investigative practices of scientists.
1 As much research has demonstrated, concepts do not arise fully formed in the head of a scientist but are created in historical processes, which can extend for considerable periods and even span generations of scientists. As I have argued previously (Nersessian 1984 (Nersessian , 2008 , novel scientific concepts arise from the interplay of attempts to solve specific problems, use of conceptual, material and analytical resources provided by the problem situation, and often through model-based reasoning processes. In such reasoning processes, models are dynamical constructions through which scientists make inferences and 1 It is also compatible with the view of "concepts in use" articulated by Kindi in contrast with the standard solve problems that sometimes require conceptual innovation and change. In the conceptual modeling practices I have studied, analogical, visual, and simulative processes are used incrementally to construct models that embody various constraints drawn from the domain under investigation (target), analogical source domain(s), and, importantly, those that arise in the constructed model itself can lead the reasoner towards a problem solution. Nersessian (2008) details how novel concepts can arise from this kind of "bootstrapping process" in which hybrid models that abstract and integrate constraints from both the domain of the target problem and selected analogical source domains are constructed, analyzed, and evaluated incrementally towards the solution of the target problem. One of the most interesting aspects of this process is that in abstracting and integrating constraints from diverse domains (including constraints that arise from the models themselves), here-to-fore unrepresented structures or behaviors can emerge and lead to the formation of novel concepts.
Although it has long been known that analogy plays an important role in creating novel concepts, all the cases I have examined from several data sources -historical, think-aloud protocols, ethnographic studies -point to a significant facet of analogy in the modeling practices of scientists that is neglected in both the philosophical and cognitive science literatures: often in cutting-edge research, there is no ready-to-hand problem solution that can be retrieved and adapted analogically from a source domain. Rather, analogical domains only provide some constraints that are incorporated into models which are constructed in accord with the epistemic goals of the scientist explicitly to serve as analogical sources for the target domain. That is, the constructed model is built explicitly to provide a comparison to the target phenomena based on analogy. Thus, the core of the problem-solving process consists in building models that embody philosophical notion of concepts as solely mental entities or abstract objects (Kindi, this volume). constraints from the target phenomena and possible analogical source domain(s), solving problems in the constructed models, and then transferring the solution as a hypothesis to the target phenomena. This point will be elaborated in a fascinating case of conceptual innovation that emerged during an ethnographic study my research group was conducting.
Until recently, research into scientific concepts has drawn exclusively from historical records. Now observational and ethnographic studies of concepts in use and development are being added to the mix and can increase significantly our understanding of their role in investigative practices. For several years, I have been conducting ethnographic research, which in part aims to investigate how concepts are used, created, and articulated in research laboratories bio-engineering sciences. These frontier areas are interesting for investigating the role of concepts in practice because the nature of the research requires some measure of interdisciplinary synthesis, and thus such areas are likely to provide a good source for cases of concept transfer and adaptation and, possibly, the formation of novel concepts. Further, during the period of our investigation, practices in these labs did actually demonstrate and confirm the centrality of modeling to conceptual innovation. However, their modeling practices include not only conceptual models, but physical and computational models as well. Thus the ethnographic studies serve to extend historical accounts of conceptual innovation.
Extending the account of model-based reasoning to encompass these kinds of models was the primary reason for venturing into a program of ethnographic research. We know that physical models have been used throughout the history of science (de Chadarevian & Hopwood 2004 ) and many sciences now make extensive use of computational models. Although historical records might note that such models were developed, the archival records of these artifacts are scant, as are detailed records of how they were made, the various versions and considerations that went into their making, and understanding of what they afford as embodied practices. As for computational models, records of the processes through which these were developed are even more scant, and consequently most of the philosophical literature is focused on the representational relations between the completed model and the world. Ethnographic research can be a valuable means for investigating model-based research in action. In this paper I will develop a case drawn from ethnographic studies of bio-engineering research labs which can help to understand how concepts are both generated by investigative practices of simulation modeling -physical and computational -and generative of such practices.
Methods: Cognitive-historical ethnography
Science studies researchers are most familiar with ethnography as a means of investigating the social and material practices of scientists. Over the last 20 years, researchers in cognitive science have adapted ethnographic methods from anthropology to study cognitive processes, such as reasoning and problem solving, in naturally situated practices (Hutchins, 1995 , Hollan et al., Goodwin 1995 , Lave, 1988 . In line with this research, we conducted "cognitive ethnographies" (Hutchins 1995) Intensive data collection was conducted in each laboratory for 2 years with follow-up of the participants, their research, and questions pertaining to our research for an additional 2 years.
Several members of our research group became participant observers of the day-to-day practices in each lab. The ethnographic part of the study (observations and open (unstructured) interviews sought to uncover the activities, tools, and meaning-making that support research as these are situated in the on-going practices of the community. We took field notes on our observations, audio taped interviews, and video and audio taped research meetings (full transcriptions are completed for 148 interviews and 40 research meetings). As a group we estimate our ethnographers (6) made over 800 hours of field observations. Early observations directed our attention to the custom-built simulation models as "hubs" for interlocking the cognitive and cultural dimensions of research. Because of this, the research meetings, though useful, assumed a lesser importance then they have in other research on cognitive practices in laboratories (see, esp., Dunbar 1995) . We needed more to elicit from researchers their understanding and perceived relation to simulation artifacts, and see how they functioned within the life of the labs, which was better addressed through interviewing and extensive field observation.
Significantly, these laboratories are evolving systems, where the custom-built technologies are designed and redesigned in the context of an experiment or from one research project to another. Researchers (who are mostly students) and simulation artifacts have intersecting historical trajectories. To capture this and other historical dimensions of research in these laboratories we used also interpretive methods of cognitive-historical analysis (Nersessian 1992 (Nersessian , 1995 (Nersessian , 2008 . In this investigation, cognitive-historical analysis examines historical records to advance an understanding of the integrated cognitive -social -cultural nature of research practices. Data collection for this part of our study included publications, grant proposals, dissertation proposals, power point presentations, laboratory notebooks, emails, technological artifacts, and interviews on lab history. 3a. Phase I: "playing with the dish" Lab D had just begun its existence when we started collecting data. The Lab director (D6) was a new assistant professor who had spent an extended postdoctoral period developing the main technologies he would need to conduct research on living neural networks. He had been interested in computational neural network modeling as an undergraduate and during graduate school in biochemistry he continued "moonlighting as a cognitive scientist" reading, attending conferences, and doing neural network modeling for fun, plus taking courses on the psychobiology of learning and memory. The current neuroscience paradigm for studying the fundamental properties of living neurons used single-cell recordings. D6 believed that to study learning there needed to be a way to study the properties of networks of neurons, since it is networks that learn in the brain. He recounted to us that somewhere around 1990 (in the middle of graduate school where he was engaged in what he felt was uninteresting research), he had the idea that "perhaps you could make a cell culture system that learns." Such a culture would more closely model learning in the brain, which is a network phenomenon, and also enable emergent properties to arise. Learning requires feedback, so the in vitro system would need to have sensory input or "embodiment" of some kind. Having read the proceedings of a conference about the simulation of adaptive behavior in computational animals or in robots using the computer as the "brain," which were called "animats" by that community, he thought "hey, you could do this in vitro -have an animat that is controlled by neurons and somehow embody it." Lab D was founded (twelve years later) to pursue his insight and the general hypothesis that advances could be made in the overarching problem of understanding the mechanisms of learning in the brain by investigating the network properties of living neurons. Figuring out the control structure for supervised learning in the living network, that is, how the dish could be trained to control the embodiment systematically using feedback, posed a significant and multifaceted problem, the solution to which would involve conceptual innovation.
The case developed here is sketched in Figure 1 , which indicates what each of the three researchers was doing during the 3-year period of interest. At the time we were collecting data,
we had no foreknowledge that we would be capturing what could prove to be highly significant conceptual innovations for the field. Fortunately, we had collected sufficient and relevant data as The dish model-system was constructed to provide a means of exploring whether learning could be induced in system of neurons with just network properties of the brain, abstracted from other brain structures. What the dish models was a subject of on-going discussion among the lab members. Some maintained that the dish is "a model of cortical neurons" while others claimed it "is a model of development [of the brain]," and, when pressed, some retreated to "it may just be a model of itself." However, all agreed with D6's belief that studying the dish will yield understanding of the basic workings of network-level cortical neurons:
First of all, it is a simplified model, I say that because the model is not -it's artificial, it's not how it is in the brain. But I think that the model would answer some basic questions, because the way the neurons interact should be the same whether it's inside or outside the brain.... I think the same rules apply.
The dish model-system is designed to provide a basic understanding of how neurons communicate and process information such that learning takes place. The intention of the director continues to be that after developing this understanding, the lab will move on to building an investigating more complex models such as "studying cultures with different brain parts mixed together, or specific 3-dimensional pieces that are put together." What is of interest for the case I develop is that in this early period, the dish was an object of interest in its own right.
When this research started, there were no established models of neuron communication.
This pioneering research began with importing some concepts from single neuron studies to start to develop an understanding of the dish and work towards the goal of getting it to learn. As an indicator of learning, they assumed the standard psychology concept, which the director (D6) stated is "a lasting change in behavior resulting from experience." Various interfaces were developed to be able to record and stimulate (provide experiences to) the dish, including a suite of software programs they called MEAbench and two forms of embodiment: computationally simulated "animat" worlds (extending the computational concept of animat to include simulation worlds in which the behavior of the computational creature is determined by being connected to living neural networks), and robotic devices ("hybrots," which stands for "hybrid robots") that could be connected to the dish. Both embodiments enabled closed-loop feedback experiments.
They operationalized learning in terms of what is known in neuroscience as the "Hebbian" notion of learning as plasticity (basically, changing the brain by adding or removing neural connections or adding new cells in response to experience) and the mathematical formulation known as the Hebbian rule (basically, "neurons that fire together wire together") as a guide. As D4 recounted later, from Hebb's postulate -which talks about learning between two neurons -we thought our data will show that something has to be added to the known equation in order for it to manifest in a population of neurons. Our idea was to figure out that manifestation.. We are now ready to focus on the two borrowed concepts at the center of the significant developments in their research, the notion of burst, transferred from single neuron studies, and the engineering notion of noise. D4 (electrical engineering), who was the first of the graduate students, helped to construct protocols for the dish model-system before moving to open-loop electrophysiology research. D11 (life sciences and chemistry) entered in a few months later and worked on the spike sorting software and then moved to closed-loop research on animats and hybrots. D2 (mechanical engineering and cognitive science) started about a month later and worked on developing some of the MEAbench software and then started closed-loop research on animats and a specific hybrot: a robotic drawing arm. At the start of our case, they were all involved in "playing with the dish," which is their term for exploring the problem space by stimulating the dish with various electrical signals and tracking the outputs. D4 then began trying to replicate a plasticity result reported by another research group, but was unable to do so largely because the dish was exhibiting spontaneous synchronous network-wide electrical activity -she called this phenomenon "bursting," extending the meaning from single neuron studies where it means the spontaneous activity of one neuron. This dish-wide phenomenon was visualized in Figure 2 as the spike activity for each electrode per recording channel, across all channels. She first attempted to introduce the term "barrage" into the community to focus attention on the network-wide nature of the phenomenon, but soon reverted to "burst" when her term did not catch on.
Bursting created a problem because it prevented the detection of any systematic change that might rise due to controlled stimulation; that is, it prevented detection of learning. The whole group believed that "bursts are bad" and thought of them in terms of the engineering concept of noise -as a disturbance in the signal that needs to be eliminated, "it's noise in the data -noise, interference....so it's clouding the effects of learning that we want to induce." The group hypothesized that the cause of bursting was lack of sensory stimulation -"deafferentation" -and D4 decided to develop different patterns of electrical stimulation to see if she could "quiet" the bursts. After about a year, she managed to quiet the bursts entirely and initiated plasticity experiments, but for nearly a year she was unable to make any progress. A new problem arose with the quieted dish: activity patterns provoked by a constant stimulation did not stay constant across trials, but "drifted" to another pattern.
During the same period, D2 was trying to use various probe responses to produce learning through closed-loop embodiments. He also spent considerable time traveling the world with an art exhibit featuring the mechanical drawing arm, controlled via satellite by a dish living in Lab D. As a research project, he was trying to get the dish to learn to control the arm systematically, but as a mechanical art exhibit, its creativity required only that it draw, not that it draw within the lines! Early in the burst-quieting period, D11 decided to build a computational model of the dish model-system and physically moved out of the physical lab space to a cubicle with a computer.
He felt the "dish is opaque" and what was needed to make progress was more control and measurement capabilities: "I feel that [computational] modeling can tell us something because the advantage of modeling is that you can measure everything, every detail of the network." The Lab director doubted the computational modeling would lead to anything interesting, but gave his consent to work on it. . This computational dish model was built to serve as an analogical source for the physical dish model-system. That is, D11 hoped that insights derived from it could eventually be mapped and transferred over to the target problem: creating supervised learning in the dish model system. As it turned, out, the computational model proved a source for both novel concepts for understanding dish phenomena and a control structure for supervised learning that were successfully transferred to the physical dish, solving the original problem. From this point, things developed rapidly in the lab as the group worked together on statistical analyses, experimentation to see whether the "drift immune" measures developed for the computational network could be transferred to the in vitro dish, and whether the "burst feedback" in the in vitro dish could be used for supervised learning with the embodiments. This phase of research began with the idea that "bursts don't seem as evil as they once did" (D4).
Most importantly, they began to develop the concept of bursts as signals (rather than only noise) that might be used to control the embodiments. Articulating the notion that bursts can be signals took the form of several interconnected novel concepts: burst type: one of limited number of burst patterns (10); burst occurrence: when a type appears; spatial extent: an estimation of burst size and specific channel location; and CAT ('center of activity trajectory'): a vector capturing the flow of activity at the population scale. With the exception of 'spatial extent' all of these concepts were developed for the simulated network first and then mapped to the in vitro dish and modified as required. Although each of these concepts is important, they are quite complex conceptually and mathematically, and so I will only provide some details of the development of 'CAT', which is an entirely novel concept for understanding neural activity and could prove to be of major importance to neuroscience.
D2 recounted during the final stages of analysis:
...the whole reason we began looking at the center of activity and the center of activity trajectory is because we are completely overwhelmed by all this data being recorded on the 60 electrodes -and we just can't comprehend it all. The big motivation to develop this is to actually have something -a visualization we can understand.
The mathematical representation of the CAT concept was articulated by making an analogy to the physics notion of center of mass and by drawing from three resources within the group: 1) D11's deep knowledge of statistical analyses from the earlier period in which he had tried to create sensory-motor mappings between the dish and the embodiments; 2) an earlier idea of another graduate student at D6's old institution (who had worked remotely with the group) that it might be possible to capture "the overall activity shift" in the in vivo dish by dividing the MEA grid into four quadrants and using some subtraction method; and 3) the idea that bursts seem to be initiated at specific sites as shown in a new graphical representation for the in vivo dish The mathematical representation of CAT includes a temporal as well as spatial dimension: "I not only care about how the channel's involved in the burst, I also care about the spatial information in there and the temporal information in there -how they propagate" (D11).
CAT tracks the spatial properties of activity as it moves through the network; that is, the flow of activity at the population scale, as displayed in the visualization screen shot (Figure 6c ). It is an averaging notion similar to the notion of population vectors, which capture how the firing rates of a group of neurons that are only broadly tuned to a stimulus, when taken together, provide an accurate representation of the action/stimulus. CAT differs from a population vector and is more complex because it tracks the spatial properties of activity as it moves through the network. That is, if the network is firing homogeneously or is quiet, the CAT will stay at the center of the dish, but if the network fires mainly in a corner, the CAT will move in that direction (see Figure 6 , 6c is the CAT representation). Thus, CAT tracks the flow of activity (not just activity) at the population scale, and much faster than population vectors. It is a novel conceptualization of neuronal activity. What the CAT analysis shows is that in letting the simulation run for a long time, only a limited number of burst types (classified by shape, size, and propagation pattern)
occurs -approximately 10. Further, if a probe stimulus is given in the same channel, "the patterns are pretty similar." Thus the CAT provides a "signature" for burst types.
[insert figure 6 here] D11 was unsure whether it would be possible to transfer the concept to the in vitro dish because his "feeling" for what the simulated dish was doing, "but the problem is that I don't think it is exactly the same as in the living network -when our experiment worked in the living an additional year and combined CAT and techniques D4 had developed for burst quieting to develop a range of stimulation patterns for the in vitro dish that led to supervised learning for the embodied dish. They got the mechanical arm to draw within the lines, and wrote and successfully defended dissertations on different aspects of this work. Interestingly, the control structure is unlike the customary structure for reinforcement learning, where the same stimulation is continually repeated. Their control structure consists of providing the network with a patterned stimulation, inducing plasticity, followed by providing a random background stimulation to stabilize its response to the patterned stimulation. Again, this method is counterintuitive to existing notions of reinforcement learning, and emerged only in the context of the group's building and playing with the two different kinds of simulation models.
Discussion
There are several features of this case that are important for thinking about concepts in investigative practices. As Steinle (this volume) reminds us, there are a wide range of epistemic aims that participate in the dynamics of concept formation in science (see also Brigandt, this volume). In frontier biomedical engineering sciences labs, chief among the aims is developing an understanding of novel in vivo phenomena sufficient to enable some degree of intervention and control. The primary investigative practice in many areas is constructing physical models that adequately exemplify the phenomena of interest so as to be able to conduct controlled experiments with the models and transfer outcomes to in vivo phenomena. The case examined here also included developing a computational simulation of the physical model. Such physical and computational models are built towards becoming analogical sources/bases. From the outset, the intention is to build an analogy but the nature of that analogy is determined incrementally, over time, with only certain features of it selected at the time of building. Often to build an analogy requires configurations of more than one model, comprising both engineered artifacts and living matter. These "model-systems" are dynamical entities that perform as structural, They understood that the emergent properties of the network might require modification of these concepts. In practice, these transferred concepts both facilitated and impeded the research. The concept of spike facilitated developing stimulation and recording methods and interpretations of the output of clusters of neurons surrounding an electrode. The concept of burst, when extended to spontaneous dish-wide electrical activity, and categorized as noise (in the engineering sense), and thus something to be "quieted," impeded the research for an extended period.
To deal with the impasse D11 introduced a new modeling method into the lab research, computational simulation of a physical model, which lead to the formation of a cluster of novel concepts ('CAT', 'spatial extent', 'burst type', 'burst occurrence') which together enabled them to understand that bursts could be signals (as well as noise). This second-order model was constructed to eventually provide an analogy to the physical model; that is, once it had sufficiently replicated in vitro dish behavior, inferences made about the phenomena taking place in it were to be transferred to the in vitro model, and potentially from there to the in vivo phenomena. The computational model merges modeling constraints, intra-domain constraints from other areas of neuroscience (brain slices, single neuron studies), and dish constraints.
Constructing the simulation model facilitated D11's thinking of the dish at the level of individual neurons and in terms of populations of neurons and how these interact dynamically to produce behavior. The network visualization reinforced this idea and provided a dynamical simulation (captured in movies that could be examined more carefully) of the real-time propagation of the activity across the network that allowed D11 to literally see that there were similar looking burst patterns -and these seemed to be limited in number. Further, he could show these to the others who could also see these phenomena. It enabled them, as they said, "to look inside the dish." The visualization could have taken numerous forms. However, the network visualization and simulation exemplify (Goodman 1968; Elgin 2009) reasoning. This has implications for both the analogy and models literatures. The built models are designed to share certain relations with the in vivo phenomena so it does not matter that in many respects they are "false models," which the philosophical literature has puzzled about.
What matters is if these relations are of the same kind as those they are meant to exemplify. For instance, the per-channel visualization does not capture the network features possessed by the in vitro dish and by the in vivo phenomena and the spatial extent visualization captures only a pattern or structure, but not behavior. The network visualization captures the network structure and behavior of both dish models.
Perhaps most importantly, though, collecting field observations and interviews surrounding cognitive-social-cultural practices during research processes provides a wealth of insight into creative processes and helps those who study science fathom aspects of such practices that would never make it into the historical records. Most prominent are the evolving dynamics of the interactions among the members of research group, between them and the modeling artifacts, and the evolution of those artifacts. Even for physical records there are many pieces that are unlikely to be archived, since researchers rarely keep detailed records of process.
The computational visualization that enabled them (and me) literally to see the burst patterns provides an example: a sentence in a publication remarking that "burst patterns were noted" does not convey its cognitive impact or the change it sparked in group dynamics which led to integration across the three research projects. My research group was, of course, not able to make all the observations and collect all the records that are pertinent to these conceptual innovations since ethnographic data collection is complex and time consuming, and of necessity selective.
Once it because apparent that major scientific developments were coming out of the Lab D research (nearly 2 years into our research), however, we did have sufficient data to mine to and could go back and collect additional data to develop the most salient aspects of the innovation processes, which are analyzed in outline form in this paper.
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Figure Captions Our representation of the bootstrapping processes involved in constructing, evaluating, and adapting the computational dish through numerous iterations. Once the in silico dish was able to replicate the in vitro dish behavior and the novel concepts were developed for it, the analysis was mapped (adapted to the specifics of its design) and transferred to the in vitro dish, and evaluated for it. Figure 4 A screen shot of the network visualization of bursting in the in silico dish. The two screen shots of the computational visualization of the network show the flow of burst activity in simulated dish at (a) burst time 1, (b) burst time 2 and (c) shows a corresponding CAT from T1 to T2. The CAT tracks the spatial properties of activity of the population of neurons as the activity moves across the network. That is, if the network is firing homogeneously or is quiet, the CAT will stay at the center of the dish (on analogy with a center of mass), but if the network fires from one direction to another as in (a) to (b), the CAT will move in that direction. 
